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Say What You Mean: Improved
Drafting Resources as a Means for
Increasing the Consistency of
Bilateral
of
Interpretation
Investment Treaties
ABSTRACT

Following the demise of international recognition of the
Hull Rule as the standard governing foreign direct investment,
countries throughout the world have turned to bilateral
investment treaties (BITs) to govern direct investment
relationships. BITs allow countries to bind themselves credibly
to commitments by granting substantive rights to investors and
offering remedies for violations of those rights, thereby
incentivizing new investments and facilitating economic
ventures. The recent dramatic increase in disputes arising
under BITs has shaken the legitimacy of these agreements.
Arbitration panels interpret these documents inconsistently,
which disparately impacts developing nations negatively. The
inconsistent interpretations rob BITs of clarity and
transparency as to the nature and extent of the commitments.
Consistency in interpretationcan be achieved through reform of
the arbitrationprocess or reform of the draftingprocess. Reform
of the arbitrationprocess would fly in the face of the nature and
characterof the arbitrationprocess, and it cannot alleviate the
interpretive difficulties the panel faces. Reform of the drafting
process can improve the documents themselves, as well as the
interpretive process. BIT drafters must conquer the inherent
difficulties of communicating intentions through language, as
well as the additional problems created by the existence of
multiple authoritative texts in different languages. This Note
concludes that improved drafting is the key to providing
consistency in interpretation,thereby increasing the credibility
To that end, this Note proposes a multilingual
of BITs.
compilation of key BIT terminology, as provided by each
individual country, to serve as a resource to drafters and
interpreters.
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IMPROVED DRAFTING RESOURCES FOR BITS
I. INTRODUCTION

"Foreign investment is a vital tool for economic development and
global prosperity."1 Developing countries rely on foreign investment
to infuse their local industries with capital and to improve their
infrastructure, while investors simultaneously receive financial
returns and a "foothold in the markets of the future. ' 2 Historically,
direct investment was governed by very loose international
customary law, in particular the Hull Rule. 3 Following joint lobbying
in the United Nations by developing countries opposed to the Hull
Rule, and generally multilateral regulation of direct investment,
investors were provided no protection when investing and, therefore,
assumed myriad risks. 4
In response to the free market for
investment, developing countries turned to contract, in the form of
Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), as a means to attract
investment. 5 These treaties influence "the initial decision to invest in
a developing nation, the structure of the investment, and the methods
of maximizing commercial benefits if there are difficulties with the
'6
investment.
In recent years, foreign direct investment (FDI) has shown
dramatic growth. Total FDI grew twenty-nine percent in 2005,
following a twenty-seven percent growth in 2004. 7 FDI includes not
only investors from developed countries investing in developing
countries, but investments in developed countries as well. 8 Although
individual countries and regions have regulations that impact direct
investment, no general customary international law exists governing

1.
Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration:
Privatizing Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1521, 1524 (2005).
2.
Id. at 1524-25.
3
See discussion infra Part II.B. ("Historical Context: The Hull Rule-Its
Importance and Its Demise"). The Hull Rule dictated host nations' treatment of
investors' property and dictated that any takings would be compensated according to a
"prompt and adequate" standard. Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties That
Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularityof Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT'L
L. 639, 644 (1998).
4.
Guzman, supra note 3, at 659. The most notable risks are the absence of
assurances against expropriation and, moreover, the lack of any clear standard as to
compensation if expropriation did occur.
5.
See id. (discussing the "dynamic inconsistency problem" and foreign direct
investment).
6.
Franck, supra note 1, at 1525.
7.
U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV. [UNCTAD], WORLD INVESTMENT
REPORT 2006-FDI FROM DEVELOPING AND TRANSITION ECONOMIES: IMPLICATIONS FOR

DEVELOPMENT at 1, U.N. Sales No. E.06.II.D.11 (2006), available at http://www.unctad.
org/en/docs/wir2006overview-en.pdf [hereinafter WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT].
8.
Id.
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these relationships. 9 Therefore, countries and investors continue to
rely heavily on BITs to provide reliability and stability for
investments.
The goals of reliability and stability have been frustrated
through the arbitration process. Dispute arbitrations under BITs
have failed to provide consistent interpretations of the treaties.' 0
Lack of consistent interpretations, combined with the ability to get
out of obligations in the treaties, particularly through manipulating
the text of the treaty, "create[] uncertainty in the global marketplace
and can serve only to discourage foreign investment." 11
Two
approaches for furthering consistent interpretation prevail: (1) reform
of the arbitration system to provide increased transparency and
develop monitoring through appellate review, and (2) reforms in the
drafting process to improve the memorialization of the parties'
12
intentions.
Arbitrators confront several challenges when interpreting
treaties.
Multiple and sometimes conflicting interpretive
methodologies and theories exist. 13 Language often serves as a poor
communicator of intent, leaving the text hollow.1 4 Additionally, BITs
are written in multiple languages, accentuating the interpretive
difficulties. 15 In particular, "the lack of precise linguistic equivalents
and differences in legal systems throughout the globe make it
virtually certain that multiple language versions will include
terminological differences that lead to conflicting interpretations of
16
the text."
The difficulties of interpretation, however, serve to influence the
drafter and encourage diligence and precision in drafting. The
drafting process and final document should not be ignored as critical
avenues to increasing the reliability of BITs. Further, multilateral
discussion of terminology is critical to providing consistent

9.
See id. at 9 (discussing changing trends in the web of international
agreements regulating foreign direct investment).
10.
Christopher Brummer, Examining the Institutional Design of International
Investment Law: Insights from the Symposium 2 (Fall 2006) (unpublished comment, on
file with author).
11.
Jarrod Wong, Umbrella Clauses in Bilateral Investment Treaties: of
Breaches of Contract, Treaty Violations, and the Divide Between Developing and
Developed Countries in ForeignInvestment Disputes, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 135, 173
(2006).
12.
See generally Brummer, supra note 10 (discussing the implications of
different theoretical frameworks for addressing issues facing foreign direct
investment).
13.
See discussion infra Part V.B ("The Interpretive Process-Background for
Drafters").
14.

Id.

15.
16.

Id.
Dinah Shelton, Reconcilable Differences? The Interpretationof Multilingual

Treaties, 20 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 611, 612 (1997).
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understanding of parties' intentions. Part I of this Note lays the
historical background for the development of BITs. Part II identifies
some of the conflicts raised by the lack of consistency in
interpretation. Part III examines the traditional common provisions
included in BITs.
Part IV further analyzes the problem of
consistency. It briefly discusses current approaches to reforming the
arbitration process and addresses the process of interpretation. Part
V offers improvements that can be made through improved drafting
and the collection of common terminology across languages to serve
as a resource when drafting and interpreting BITs.

II.

DEFINITION OF AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT FOR BILATERAL
INVESTMENT TREATIES

A. Definition
BITs have become a universal tool for documenting foreign
investment relationships, "detail[ing] . . . legal rules for allowing and
protecting foreign investment. '17 BITs are individually negotiated
between sovereign nation-states who agree to encourage, promote,
and protect the investments that Country A companies make in
Country B.18 These treaties define the scope and definition of foreign
investment, including which investors and investments are covered
by the agreement (the scope of application). 19 The main provisions
typically "cover four substantive areas: admission, treatment,
expropriation and the settlement of disputes. '' 20 Bilateral investment

17.
2 RALPH H. FOLSOM, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS §§ 25.20,
27.3 (2d ed. 2002).
18
Franck, supra note 1, at 1522 n.3; UNCTAD, Investment Instruments
Online: What are BITs?, http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/Page
1006.aspx (last
visited Oct. 14, 2007).
19.
UNCTAD, Bilateral Investment Treaties 1959-1999, at 20, U.N. Doc.
UNCTADIITE/IIA2 (2000), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/poiteiiad2.
en.pdf [hereinafter U.N. BilateralInvestment Treaties]; Int'l Ctr. for Settlement of Inv.
Disputes, World Bank, Bilateral Investment Treaties (1996), available at
http://www.worldbank.org/icsidltreaties/intro.htm
[hereinafter
ICSID Bilateral
Investment Treaties].
20.
ICSID Bilateral Investment Treaties, supra note 19. More specifically, BITs
generally include provisions on the following themes:
[A]dmission of investments; national and most-favoured-nation treatment; fair
and equitable treatment; guarantees and compensation in respect of
expropriation and compensation for war and civil disturbances; guarantees of
free transfer of funds and repatriation of capital and profits; subrogation on
insurance claims; and dispute-settlement provisions, both State-to-State and
investor-to-State. In addition, some BITs include provisions regarding
transparency of national laws; performance requirements; entry and sojourn of
foreign personnel; general exceptions; and extension of national and mostfavoured-nation-treatment to the entry and establishment of investments.
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treaties developed to fill in the gaps where international law failed to
provide a code of conduct for host nations, "promot[ing] national
treatment and protect[ing] . . . investors abroad."' 21

BITs not only

filled the gaps, but also expanded investor protection by allowing "for
private parties (investors) to directly initiate arbitration with host
states." 22 Such benefits of BITs have reduced the numbers signed
between developed nations, particularly because investment relations
between those countries operate according to various instruments
adopted under the auspices of the 23Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD).
The Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) and Pakistan
signed the first bilateral investment treaty, focusing exclusively on
the protection of investment, on November 25, 1959.24 The number of
25
BITs has increased dramatically since that first treaty signing.
Between 1959 and 1991 over 400 BITs were signed, which was
followed by a flurry of treaty signing in the 1990s. 26 By 2005, 2,495
treaties had been signed, encompassing at least 176 countries. 27 The
dramatic increase in BIT agreements reflects their "rise[] to
prominence during a period in which the international regulation of
foreign investment was the subject of great change, uncertainty, and
During this period, the Hull Rule, which had
controversy."28
previously dictated international custom on compensation following
expropriation, met its demise. 29 Developed and developing nations
then began signing binding international agreements to govern
investment relationships, ultimately offering investors more
30
protection than the Hull Rule had.

U.N. Bilateral Investment Treaties, supra note 19, at 20. BITs universally address
these themes, however, the exact content of the provision varies widely, even between
one country's BITs, "reflecting different approaches as well as bargaining positions."

Id.
21.

2 FOLSOM, supra note 17, § 25.26.

AARON COSBEY ET AL., INVESTMENT AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: A
22.
GUIDE TO THE USE AND POTENTIAL OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS 3

(2004), availableat http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2004/investmentinvest-andsd.pdf.
U.N. BilateralInvestment Treaties, supra note 19, at 4.
23.
24.

RUDOLF DOLZER & MARGRETE STEVENS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES

1 (1995); Guzman, supra note 3, at 653.
Guzman, supra note 3, at 652.
25.
26.
Id.; Jayati Ghosh, Treaties to Protect Foreign Investors, FRONTLINE (India),
Apr. 22-May 5, 2006, available at http://www.bilaterals.org/article.php3?id-article=
4573.

27.
WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT, supra note 7, at 9; Guzman, supra note 3, at
652; Ghosh, supra note 26.
28.
Guzman, supra note 3, at 641.
Id. at 642.
29.
Id.
30.

20071

IMPROVED DRAFTING RESOURCES FOR BITS

B. HistoricalContext: The Hull Rule-Its Importance and Its Demise
Traditionally, foreign investors were given limited rights under
customary international law. 3 1 During the early twentieth century,
host nations took the view that investors' property would be protected
and property takings would be compensated according to a "prompt
and adequate" standard. 32 This standard was termed the "Hull Rule"
following a dispute between Mexico and the United States. 33 The
United States Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, articulated the full
compensation standard in diplomatic notes exchanged during the
dispute. 34 The Hull Rule required that compensation be "prompt,
adequate, and effective." 35 Following decolonization, newly formed
independent sovereign states began to voice their objections to the
Hull Rule, often stipulating that it was not based on a universally
36
accepted theory of international law.
Following World War II, nationalizations and expropriations
increased, bringing disdain surrounding the Hull Rule to the
forefront. 37 During this period, developing countries supported "a less
stringent compensation requirement for expropriations than the Hull
Rulea. '' 38 In the 1960s, developing nations took their cause to the
United Nations, pointing out that the actual practice of compensating
expropriations was not always consistent with the Hull Rule, and
furthermore, the Rule lacked the sufficient international support
required of customary international law. 39 From 1962 through the
mid-1970s, developing nations succeeded in getting the United
Nations General Assembly to pass "a series of resolutions intended to
emphasize the sovereignty of nations with respect to foreign
investment. '40 The UN resolutions supported developing countries
who refuted the assertion that the Hull Rule was consistent with
customary international law. 41 The 1962 Resolution articulated the
standard in terms of "appropriate compensation," thereby prompting
'42
further debate over the definition of "appropriate.
Additional resolutions, lobbied for by developing nations,
solidified the UN's position that the Hull Rule was no longer

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 24, at 10.
Guzman, supra note 3, at 644.
Id. at 645.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 646.
Id. at 646-47.
Id. at 647.
Id. at 648.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 648-49.
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customary law. 43 Further, the UN General Assembly passed a
resolution stating that nation-states have "[fjull permanent
sovereignty .

.

. over [their]

natural resources and all economic

activities;" in light of that, "[n]o State may be subjected to economic,
political or any other type of coercion to prevent the free and full
exercise of this inalienable right."a The resolutions indicated that an
international obligation of repayment would no longer be
45
recognized.
The UN resolutions indicated that, as a group, developing
countries "prefer a regime under which they are able to expropriate
property when they feel it is justified and under which they need only
pay what they determine to be appropriate compensation. '46 The
result for investors was essentially a cartel of developing nations who
refused to provide assurance of compensation. 47 The climate was ripe
for opportunism.
Following the demise of the Hull Rule, the international rules for
"investment were entirely uncertain and individual states were in a
'48
position to determine what constituted appropriate compensation.
Investors therefore bore the risk that, following an agreement with a
sovereign state and subsequent to spending for sunk costs, a state
may alter the agreement. 49 Faced with this dilemma, investors
generally would accept such alterations because, having spent for the
initial costs, pulling out of the investment often was more costly than
merely adjusting to changes to the agreement.
This dilemma is the result of the "dynamic inconsistency
problem. 5 0 The problem "exists when a preferred course of action,
once undertaken, cannot be adhered to without the establishment of
some commitment mechanism." 51 In private transactions parties
avoid the dynamic inconsistency problem through contracts, which
are enforceable under domestic law. 5 2 Following the demise of the
Hull Rule in the international setting, however, sovereign states
could not "credibly bind [themselves] to a particular set of legal rules
' 53
when [they] negotiate[d] with a potential investor.

43.
Id.
44.
Id. at 649-50.
45.
Id.
46.
Id. at 651.
47.
See generally id. at 646-51 (discussing the "The Decline and Fall of the
Hull Rule")
48.
Id. at 651.
49.
See id. (discussing the victory won by developing nations as a result of
declining to follow the Hull Rule as customary international law).
50.
Id. at 658.
51.
Id.
52.
Id. at 658-59.
53.
Id. at 659.
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BITs resolve the dynamic inconsistency problem. They "provide
a way for a host country to make credible and binding commitments
to an investor. '54 BITs incentivize new investments, help facilitate
ventures in the presence of economic opportunity, and characterize a
host country's investment climate. 55
Host states can gain an
advantage to encourage investment in their countries due to this
credibility. BITs further this confidence through two innovations: (1)
by "grant[ing] investors a series of specific substantive rights, which
help contribute to the stable investment climate of an investment":
and (2) by "offer[ing] investors direct remedies to address violations of
those substantive rights. '56 The credibility host states gain from
BITs, however, is undermined if that BIT is not upheld at arbitration
according to the agreed upon terms. 5 7 This conflict is particularly
illustrated in arbitrations involving investors and states trying to
enforce the binding nature of the BIT to resolve investment disputes.

III. BIT DEVELOPMENT

AND CURRENT CONFLICTS

When investors are considering a new foreign investment, host
countries, as in any business venture, position themselves to offer the
best "investment package" to the investor.
The dynamic
inconsistency problem, however, means that once the deal is done, the
host country does not have to abide by any of the promises made
during the negotiation period: it does not have to offer benefits;
rather, it only has to "treat the investor well enough to keep the
investment. '58 The legitimacy of the final agreement is as important
to the investing decision as the credibility of the host country's
promise. 59 Therefore, bilateral investment treaties will offer no
credibility if they have no legitimacy, as indicated by arbitration
decisions that uphold the intent of the parties to the BIT.
The problem of bilateral investment treaty legitimacy has
recently become more apparent. 60 Prior to 1995, few disputes arose;
however, from 2000 on, the number of cases has exploded. 6 1 By 2005,
bilateral investment treaties had been involved in over sixty
arbitrations. 62 The BITs themselves contain provisions stipulating

54.
Id.
55.
DOLZER & STEVENS, supranote 24, at 12.
56.
Franck, supra note 1, at 1529.
57.
See Wong, supra note 11, at 139 (highlighting the marketplace uncertainty
involved with allowing nations to go back on BIT provisions, particularly umbrella
clauses).
58.
Guzman, supra note 3, at 661.
59.
Franck, supra note 1,at 1529.
60.
Id. at 1521.
61.
Id.
62.
Id.
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arbitration as a means for settling disputes.6 3 Two types of disputes
may arise: (1) disputes between the contracting parties (nationstates), called inter-governmental disputes, and (2) disputes between
the host State and the investor, called investment disputes. 64 Intergovernmental disputes are typically resolved through ad hoc
arbitration, which is "non-institutional arbitration governed by rules
65
specially formulated for and inserted into the text of the treaty."
Investment disputes, however, usually call for "institutional or other
pre-existing arbitration rules which are simply incorporated into the
treaty by reference. '6 6 In either case, the arbitration panel or
tribunal ultimately confronts the task of interpretation. Variations in
interpretations are the root of inconsistency in the arbitral process.
A. Introduction to the Conflict of Inconsistent Interpretationsin
Arbitration
articulate
"some
public
Bilateral
investment
treaties
international law rights ... for the first time. '6 7 These rights include
"the right to 'fair and equitable treatment' and a Sovereign's
obligation to 'observe its commitments.' 68 International agreements
are arbitrated in a closed forum, in front of international tribunals
that apply "these standards differently and [make] divergent findings
70
on liability. 6 9 Further, no single forum exists for arbitrating BITs.
Tribunals serving as potential venues for arbitration include those
organized under the International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID), the International Chamber of
Commerce (ICC), the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC), and
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
71
(UNICTRAL).
Arbitration agreements in BITs are premised on the commercial
arbitration model, and therefore, connote a strong presumption of
confidentiality. 72 Pursuant to this presumption, access to pleadings
and evidence is minimal for non-parties, amici curiae participation is
nominal, and decisions often remain confidential and are never
released to the public. 73 In UNICTRAL proceedings, disclosure of the

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 24, at 119.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Franck, supra note 1, at 1523.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1541.
Id.
Id. at 1544.
Id. at 1544-45.
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existence of a dispute and information and documentation related to
74
the dispute is at the parties' discretion.
When drafting a BIT, countries must consider potential future
questions of interpretation. 75 General rules of treaty interpretation
apply, including those embodied in the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties. 76 For example, Article 31 of the Convention states
as follows:
A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context
77
and in the light of its object and purpose.

Even though this general guideline for interpretation exists, many of
the terms used in these treaties "require evaluation and judgment of
the kind that could in turn lead to disputes about degree rather than
terminology. '78 This is of particular concern as arbitration claims
have ranged from disputes arising out of clear-cut expropriation to
more recent claims "target[ing] a wide range of regulatory and
administrative treatment which may have allegedly diminished the
value of an investment. '79 Language in itself serves poorly to
communicate intent and thus increases the difficulties encountered
when passing judgment on degree of terminology. 80 Patrick Juillard
notes that "standards-laden language of 'just' and 'fair' treatment
may involve applications by tribunals that are very different from the
expectations arising from the legal culture of the host. '81 Further,
the problem of interpretation is compounded by the fact that BITs are
usually written in two or three different languages. 82 This results in
inconsistent interpretations that undermine the credibility and
legitimacy of the agreement.
B. The Conflict of Inconsistency as ParticularlyProblematicfor
Developing Countries
Inconsistent interpretations disparately impact developing
nations. Developing countries are disadvantaged from the start, in
that they have "presumably ... less bargaining power in negotiating

74.
Luke Eric Peterson, Analysis: Will UNCITRAL Arbitrations become even
more secretive?, INV. TREATY NEWS, Sept. 3, 2005, available at http://www.bilaterals.
org/article.php3?idarticle=5730.
75.
The issue of interpretation will be explored in more depth infra Part IV.
76.
77.

DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 24, at 15.
Id.

78.
Id. at 16. This includes terms such as "fair and equitable treatment" and
"reasonable installments." Id.
79.
COSBEY ET AL., supra note 22, at 16.
80.
See infra Part IV.B.ii.
81.
Brummer, supra note 10, at 2.
82.
Id.
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a BIT."83 Additionally, "the general normative effect of bilateral
investment treaties in the final analysis [(e.g., arbitration)] depends
on the extent to which they are viewed as 'fair and balanced regimes
for foreign investment outside the immediate context of the bilateral
relationships."'8 4
Disparate bargaining power will impede the
developing countries' abilities to produce a fair and balanced regime.
For example, developing countries "are heavily dependent on the
United States for aid," and, thus, they willingly adopt the U.S. Model
Treaty, ending negotiation.8 5 Generally, BIT negotiations start with
86
the model agreements of the capital-exporting countries.
Developing
countries,
therefore,
are
precluded
from
memorializing their intentions in the document. For example, the
United States Model BIT, as originally drafted, was problematic
because it included a dispute settlement provision that ran "counter
to the principles of the Calvo doctrine. 8 7 The dispute settlement
provision stated:
For purposes of this Article, an investment dispute is defined as a
dispute involving (a) the interpretation or application of an investment
agreement between a Party and a national or company of the other
Party; (b) the interpretation or application of any investment
authorization granted by its foreign investment authority to such
national or company; or (c) an alleged breach of an right conferred or
88
created by this Treaty with respect to an investment.

Many Latin-American countries adhere to the Calvo doctrine, which
"insists on the strict abstention from interference by other nations in
areas within the host country's exclusive control. '8 9 These countries
are particularly concerned with "the adjudication of disputes
involving resources or conduct within their borders and the control
over compensation for acts of nationalization or expropriation." 90
Both of these concerns seem common to the developing nations that
want to encourage investment in their own countries, particularly

83.
Wong, supra note 11, at 138. This does not contend that the bargain is
completely one-sided, because the host State will benefit from the adoption of the BIT
since it will "foster a more hospitable, and therefore, more attractive, environment for
foreign investment." Id. at 139. Developing countries, however, are particularly
disadvantaged when attempting to enter a BIT with a wealthy developed country that
has a formal model BIT in use. The developing country, who seeks investment, is in a
weaker position because it is seeking the investment and is inherently disadvantaged
as a developing country bargaining with a developed power.
84.
DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 24, at 18.
85.
Valerie H. Ruttenberg, Comment, The United States Bilateral Investment
Treaty Program:Variations on the Model, 9 U. PA. J. INT'L BUS. L. 121, 125 (1987).
86.
DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 24, at 13.
87.
Ruttenberg, supra note 85, at 130.
88.
Kathleen Kunzer, Recent Development: Developing a Model Bilateral
Investment Treaty, 15 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 273, A-8 (1983) (quoting language of
Article VII, paragraph 1).
89.
Ruttenberg, supranote 85, at 130.
90.
Id.
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because they are clearly not in the economic position to make certain
assurances. The People's Republic of China also objected to the U.S.
dispute resolution provision because of differing concepts of
sovereignty and the existence of "an independent body having
authority over disputes." 91
Differing ideas of sovereignty also become issues when adopting
a standard of treatment under the agreement. 92 Tension exists
between host countries preferring to grant most favored nation status
and investors desiring national treatment. 93 For example, "LatinAmerican countries [traditionally] believe[d] that the national
treatment standard is the most advantageous standard for the
foreign investor, but not for the host country, because it guarantees
that those investors will not be discriminated against solely because
they are foreigners. ''94 Instead, Latin-American countries seem to
have preferred the most-favored nation standard. 95 Developing
countries also "fear that unrestricted private foreign investment may
not be beneficial to their interests," so seek inclusion of performance
requirement provisions. 96
Developing countries view performance
requirements as a means of protecting national policies in
"employment, pricing, regional development, market competition, and
foreign trade" and "promot[ing] their balance of trade and [fostering]
growth in local industries." 97 These ideological considerations must
be written into the document. Disparate bargaining power is the first
hurdle encountered, quickly followed by the difficulties encountered
in the failures of language and translation.
This disproportionate bargaining power necessitates an
international consensus on the key terminology used in these
treaties. Since developing countries are not even given the full
opportunity to advocate for their cause during treaty drafting, these
countries must again come together as they did to defeat the Hull
Rule.
Once united in their cause, they may pressure the
international community into a consensus on various nomenclatures
to be incorporated into model treaties worldwide so as to provide
assurance that the documents memorialize the negotiations and

91.
Id.
92.
Id. at 132.
93.
Most favored nation status requires host countries to afford investor
countries the same privileges, particularly trade terms, afforded to other countries.
BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1035 (8th ed. 2004); Michael Doyle et al., Asia and Pacific
Law, 41 INT'L LAW 711, 725 n.84 (2007). The national treatment standard requires
host countries to afford investor countries "the same regulatory treatment that they
would ordinarily bestow on their domestic producers and service providers." Id.
94.

Ruttenberg, supra note 85, at 132.

95.
96.
97.

Id. at 133.
Id.
Id.
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agreements. This would provide some security and reliability by
enabling more predictable interpretations of the included provisions.

IV. DRAFTING A BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY: TRADITIONAL

PROVISIONS
Several countries do have model agreements and negotiate
modifications to these model or "template" treaties to appease some
interests of capital-importing countries or recipients of capital. 98 The
U.S. Model BIT includes the following primary targets: "performance
requirements,
standard
of
treatment,
expropriation
and
nationalization, monetary transfers, and the settlement of investment

disputes."9 9 Subsequently, or in spite of this fact, BITs appear to be
remarkably similar in their organization and content.10 0 The basic
structure of a BIT includes articles containing provisions describing
definitions, promotion of investment, protection of investment,
expropriation
and
compensation,
repatriation,
and
dispute
settlement.101

Some scholars believe that individually negotiated BITs have
"not led to important divergences," and that most elements are
"consistently ... expressed in standard terms. ' 10 2 The compensation
provisions of various model treaties contain slight variations that can
lead to interpretive difficulties. Descriptions of compensation range
from unmodified "compensation" to modifiers including prompt,
adequate, effective, or various combinations of the three. 10 3 The

98.
DOLZER & STEVENS, supranote 24, at 13.
99.
Ruttenberg, supra note 85, at 126.
100.
Wong, supra note 11, at 141.
101.
See generally DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 24, Annex I: Model
Agreements (providing model agreements from Austria, Denmark, Germany, Hong
Kong, Netherlands, Swiss Confederation, Great Britain, and the United States). The
list of articles by no means is conclusive but merely delineates several of the
predominant sections contained in a representative sample of model BITs from
developed countries.
102.
Id. at 14.
103.
Id.
The Austrian model provision on compensation for expropriated
territory states that
Investments ... shall not be expropriated ... except for a public purpose by
due process of law and against compensation....
[C]ompensation shall amount
to the value of the investment immediately preceding the time in which the
actual or impending measure became public knowledge....
Id. at 169-70 (emphasis added) (quoting the English translation of Austrian Model
Treaty drafted February 1994).
Denmark's model provision states:
Investments . . . shall not be expropriated or subjected to measures having
effect equivalent to nationalization or expropriation . . . except for a public
purpose related to the internal needs of the expropriating Party, on a basis of
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standard by which compensation is measured also varies from no
market value, real value, genuine value, or fair
standard to value,
04
market value.1
Sample provisions illustrate the variety of specificity and
terminology that nation-states use to express the concepts

prompt,
adequate and
effective
non-discrimination
and
against
compensation....
Such compensation shall amount to the market value of the
investment immediately before the expropriation or impending expropriation
become public knowledge...
Id. at 180 (emphasis added) (quoting the English translation of Denmark Model Treaty
drafted November 1991).
Hong Kong's model provision states:
Investors . . . shall not be deprived of their investments nor subjected to
measures having effect equivalent to such deprivation ... except lawfully, for a
public purpose related to the internal needs of that Party, and against
compensation.
Such compensation shall amount to the real value of the
investment immediately before the deprivation ....
Id. at 204 (emphasis added) (quoting the English translation of Hong Kong Model
Treaty).
The Netherlands' model states:
Neither Contracting party shall take any measures depriving, directly or
indirectly, nationals of the other Contracting Party or their investments unless
. . . the measures are taken against just compensation. Such compensation
shall represent the genuine value of the investments affected ....
Id. at 213 (emphasis added) (quoting the English translation of Netherlands Model
Treaty, drafted May 1993).
The Swiss Confederation model states:
Neither ... shall take, either directly or indirectly, measures of expropriation
...or any other measure having the same nature or the same effect... unless
the measures are taken in the public interest, on a nondiscriminatory basis,
and under the process of law, and provided that provisions be made for effective
and adequate compensation ....
Id. at 222 (emphasis added) (quoting the English translation of Swiss Confederation
Model Treaty, drafted June 1986). The provision contains no reference to what basis
should be used for determining the value of the expropriated property beyond stating
that the compensation be effective and adequate.
Finally, the United States model agreement states:
Investments shall not be expropriated or nationalized either directly or
indirectly through measures tantamount to expropriation or nationalization
[...] except: for a public purpose; in a nondiscriminatory manner; upon
payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation . . . Compensation
shall be equivalent to the fair market value of the expropriate investment
immediate before the expropriatory action was taken or became known ....
Id. at 245 (emphasis added) (quoting the English translation of United States of
America Model Treaty, drafted February 1992). This language has remained virtually
unchanged in the model treaty. See Practising Law Institute, United States Model
Bilateral Investment Treaty, in INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION
2006 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice, Course Handbook Series No. 8710, 2006).
104.
Id.
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memorialized in the agreement. 10 5 Further, the language used
demonstrates how much BIT- drafters depend on ambiguous and
value-laden language.
Although each provision speaks to
compensation, its modifiers connote varying intentions.
The
provisions range from mere "compensation" to "just compensation,"
"effective and adequate" compensation, or "prompt, adequate, and
effective" compensation. 10 6 The variations in the legal cultures of the
negotiating parties, as well as the legal cultures of eventual
interpreting bodies, however, lead to the result that "countries may
not at the time of treaty formation fully understand the extent of
their agreements, and thus fail to adequately negotiate their
provisions." 10 7 One illustration of this issue "concerns measures
which do not formally deprive the owner of his title to property, but
that on the whole have the same effect as expropriation.' 10 8 In this
case, the tribunal may be called to determine whether a BIT's
provision on expropriation extends to the specified "indirect"
expropriation. 10 9 Thus, although there are model treaties, there
remains a discrepancy in interpretation. It stands to reason that a
model treaty is insufficient since the model only represents the
model-creating nation-state's interests. Additionally, even though
BITs may be similar in form and content, the model would not resolve
110
issues of translation and intention captured by language.
Therefore, although a universal template-as opposed to individual
state models-may be helpful, it will not ultimately resolve the issues
of interpretative inconsistencies and failures to protect developing
countries' intentions.
Other factors might also prevent a general model treaty from
being a success. The model U.S. BIT, for example, lacks flexibility
and "espous[es] provisions that are directly opposed to the interests of
many developing nations."1 1 ' Developing nations, therefore, face
several obstacles when negotiating a treaty that will attempt to yield
consistent interpretation. Further, BITs are considered beneficial
"because they focus on [narrow] objectives and enumerate specific
ways of regulating the establishment and control of foreign
investments." 112 A universal model treaty is unlikely to capture the
diverse array of potential objectives and regulatory schemes. Success
in terms of increased reliability is not likely to be accomplished since

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 103-08.
Brummer, supra note 10, at 2.
DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 23, at 14.
Id.
See discussion infra Part V.B.
Ruttenberg, supra note 85, at 123.
Id. at 124.
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the specificity of the treaty is only useful if it is enforced, and it can
only be enforced when interpreted as the parties intended.

V.

PROBLEMS OF CONSISTENCY: ARBITRATION REFORM AND
INTERPRETATIVE DIFFICULTIES

Ultimately the current issue is that
[substantive] obligations agreed to under the myriad treaties are too
varied and inconsistently interpreted by ad hoc tribunals to provide
clarity and transparency for host states as to the nature and extent of
their commitments; and procedurally, ICSID tribunal judges are either
113
too ideological or ethically conflicted to act as proper deciders.

This is a problem because "widespread retreat from commitments and
commitment-making would leave foreign investors with diminished
comfort for their investments, disrupting systems of international
economic governance." 114
Further, "[o]nce disputes arise, the
substantive commitments memorialized in agreements are then
interpreted in a heavy-handed manner during the arbitration
process[,] a phenomenon made possible due to the absence of
adequate control mechanisms."'115
Current scholars have addressed the concern over inconsistent
116
interpretations by calling for a review of the arbitration process.
Their work suggests (1) increasing the transparency of the arbitration
process and (2) creating appellate review of arbitration. 117 These
suggestions, however, essentially fly in the face of the character and
nature of arbitration. 1 8
Countries are willing to submit to
arbitration because the process is opaque; it is a closed system,
illustrating the desire to prevent information revealed in the
proceedings from being disclosed. n 9 Similarly, an appellate review
process is objectionable since it impedes the arbitration goal of
120
efficiency.
Even if these reforms came into being, they would function only
as a patch on a greater problem of interpretation. The United States
judicial system has both transparency and an appellate review

113.
Brummer, supra note 10, at 1.
114.
Id.
115.
Id. at 2.
116.
See generally id. (discussing the position of various scholars).
117.
See generally id. (summarizing discussion regarding transparency in the
arbitration process and the possibility of appellate review of arbitration).
118.
See infra text accompanying notes 123-31.
119.
Naveen Gurudevan, An Evaluation of Current Legitimacy-Based Objections
to NAFTA's Chapter 11 Investment Dispute Resolution Process, 6 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J.
399, 426 (2005).
120.
Gary W. Jackson, Prosecuting Class Actions in Arbitration, in 1 ALTA
ANNUAL CONVENTION REFERENCE MATERIALS (2006).
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system, yet inconsistent interpretations abound. Even if consistency
in interpretation can be reached, the greater goal of consistent and
correct interpretation is not necessarily achieved by an after-the-fact
review, and arguably not achieved at all.
The drafting process, therefore, is equally critical to the
interpretation problem. The goal is to create treaties that accurately
capture the intent of the contracting nation-states and then articulate
those intentions in a form that can be appropriately interpreted in
future relations. Improving the drafting process involves working
backwards, identifying the flaws in arbitral interpretations, and
hypothesizing ways to avoid them when constructing the document
itself. Only through awareness of how treaties-and in particular
multilingual treaties-are interpreted can the drafting process be

amended.
A. ArbitrationRestructuringas a Means to Improving Consistency of

Interpretation
Scholarly commentary on the problem of consistency and BITs
focuses on restructuring the present arbitration system in the hopes
of producing more consistent BIT interpretations. 12 1
Developing
countries are particularly injured by the current system since
international tribunals have little accountability, are often beholden
to multinational corporations, and are not bound by precedent or
review by the contracting states. 122 As stated above, two prongs exist
within arguments for arbitration restructuring: (1) increased
transparency and (2) appellate review.1 2 Both these suggestions run
contradictory to the goals of arbitration: efficiency, privacy, and cost124
savings.

121.
See generally Brummer, supra note 10 (discussing the scholarly debate
regarding reform to the arbitration process).
122.
Id. at 2 (describing the opening presentation of M. Sornarajh). The open
system within which these tribunals function allows the tribunals to "impose an
'injustice of rules' [that] extend[s] key terms substantive commitments . . . [that]
extend far beyond the reasonable expectations of host state governments." Id.; see also
discussion supra Part I.B.
123.
See generally id. (including remarks made by Patrick Juillard describing
the "lack of transparency to the substantive commitments provided for under
investment agreements" as problematic because "[tihough treaties may employ
similarly phrased commitments, their standards-laden language of 'just' and 'fair'
treatment may involve applications by tribunals that are very different from the
expectations arising from the legal culture of the host state.").
124.
Jackson, supra note 120; see also Caryn Litt Wolfe, Faith-Based
Arbitration: Friend or Foe? An Evaluation of Religious Arbitration Systems and Their
Interaction with Secular Courts, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 427, 444 (2006) (noting that
"resolving disputes efficiently and reducing litigation" are two goals of arbitration).
Arbitration has unique benefits within the international sphere in that it provides a
neutral forum. Susan D. Franck, InternationalArbitrators: Civil Servants? Sub Rosa
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Arguing that transparency of arbitration proceedings is
inherently an improvement of the process ignores the fundamental
character of arbitration. Transparency in international investment
125
arbitration has only recently become more widely accepted.
Proponents of increased transparency note that modern legal systems
view it as "a central fairness value."'1 26 This is, however, a stark
departure from the previously accepted notion that disputes between
States and foreign investors are private. 127 Additionally, commercial
arbitration holds confidentiality as "the paramount value and often a
precondition for parties agreeing to submit to arbitration. 1 28 Thus,
increased transparency may encroach upon parties' willingness to
submit to arbitration, thereby eroding much of the purpose for which
further crippling the
bilateral investment treaties were created 12and
9
goals of credible and binding commitments.
Appellate review of arbitration decisions also contradicts basic
notions of the nature of arbitration. Arbitration, which is required by
BITs, provides awards that are meant to be final; that is, the decision
This
by the arbitration panel is intended to be conclusive. 130
31
promotes efficiency, a prominent advantage of arbitration. '
Additionally, arbitration is structured so that the parties select the
arbitrators who are "required to render decisions in an 'independent'
' 13 2
or 'impartial' manner.'
Reviewing arbitration decisions would thwart its goalsefficiency and finality-by extending the resolution process to include
review and potential re-trials. Additionally, review would remove the
assurances that parties are provided through selecting the arbitration
panel. Further, arbitration "is a creature of contract," within which
parties can contract for their desires and expectations.13 3 Imposing a
monitoring system or review system on arbitration impinges upon the

Advocates? Men of Affairs?: The Role of InternationalArbitrators, 12 ILSA J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 499, 501 (2006).
Jorge E. Vinuales, Amicus Intervention in Investor-State Arbitration, 61
125.
JAN Disp. RESOL. J. 72, 73 (2007) (noting in particular an increased acceptance in
investor-state arbitrations). Proponents of increased transparency find the "public
character of trade and foreign investment disputes" to be influential. Id.
126.
Gurudevan, supra note 119, at 426.
127.
Vinuales, supra note 125, at 73.
Particularly, "the aspect of
128.
Gurudevan, supra note 119, at 426.
confidentiality is the chief attraction of arbitration." Id. at n. 182 (citing MOSHE HIRSH,
THE ARBITRATION MECHANISM OF THE INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR THE SETTLEMENT
OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES 10 (1993)).

See discussion supra Part I.B.
129.
130.
See Katherine A. Helm, The Expanding Scope of Judicial Review of
ArbitrationAwards: Where Does the Buck Stop?, 61 JAN DISP. RESOL. J. 16, 17 (2007).
Id. at 18. Arbitration is considered a speedy and less costly resolution to
131.
disputes. Id.
Franck, supra note 124, at 501.
132.
133.
Id. at 502.
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parties' freedom to contract.13 4 If appellate review of international
arbitrations is provided through domestic courts, host states become
vulnerable to an infringement of their sovereignty not agreed to in
bilateral investment treaties. 135 Submission to arbitration itself runs
counter to the concept of sovereignty, and therefore, the legal
community should be careful when asking nation-states to submit to
136
further judicial scrutiny.
Increased transparency alone, or combined with the development
of a review system to monitor arbitration decisions, may provide

improvements in the arbitration system, but would by no means
guarantee accurate interpretations of treaties. Nor would changes

fully ameliorate the problem of inconsistent or inaccurate treaty
interpretation. Additionally, arbitration itself involves significant
transaction costs. 1 3 7 Therefore, scholarly commentary stops in error
at merely suggesting that current dispute settlement procedures be

revamped.

Altering the dispute resolution process is insufficient to

assure host states that their intentions will be articulated in their

BITs.
As one author notes, "legal certainty, predictability, and
conflict avoidance require the greatest clarity and precision in the

drafting

of

legal

texts. ' 138

Examining

and

implementing

improvements to the drafting of BITs is equally-if not more-helpful
in the process of achieving consistent and reliable investment treaty

relations. 139

134.
Much of this criticism of arbitration review is premised on the fact that the
review is imposed on the parties and has not been explicitly negotiated for or agreed to
in the treaty where the parties agree to the arbitration forum.
135.
Gurudevan, supra note 119, at 419.
136.
This article does not argue that arbitration should not be used. Conversely,
the nation-state parties to BITs agree to arbitration proceedings in the bilateral
investment treaty and have thereby agreed to submit to arbitration. Further, the
author acknowledges that arbitration has evolved "from the lack of existing feasible
alternatives" and therefore should continue to serve as the primary dispute resolution
mechanism, at least until a "more neutral alternative to arbitration whereby private
investors' rights against expropriation [or other contract disputes] may be vindicated."
Id. at 421. Arbitration serves an important purpose in investment relations; however,
its encroachment on sovereignty should not be forgotten. This, combined with the
flaws of arbitration, suggests that an alternative approach to improving the consistent
interpretation of treaties is necessary; reliance on the arbitration process alone is
insufficient.
137.
Brummer, supra note 10, at 3 (summarizing Susan Frank's commentary on
the effectiveness of arbitral enforcement mechanisms).
138.
Shelton, supra note 16, at 611.
139.
Similarly, Bart Legum posits that parties can be protected through explicit
drafting of expectations and provisions, which is less costly than an overhaul of the
current dispute resolution system. Brummer, supra note 10, at 4. Additionally, Legum
argues that the case for change in the system has not been made, particularly since
litigation of BITs remains relatively infrequent. Id.
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B. The InterpretativeProcess-Backgroundfor Drafters
To properly draft a bilateral investment treaty, the drafters must
have some notion of how the treaty will be interpreted. Therefore, an
examination of the current issues and problems in treaty
interpretation is helpful in shaping the recommendations on how to
improve drafting. Bilateral investment treaties compound universal
contract and statutory interpretative issues. 140 When interpreting a
BIT, the panel or tribunal confronts the interpretive difficulties
inherent in determining the parties' intent and the textual meaning
of the treaty's provisions.
The tribunal must also confront
interpretive issues of multilingualism. 14 1
The interpretative
difficulties reflect "long-standing and continuing conflict between the
investment interests of developing countries and developed
countries."' " 42
Further, drafting occurs within an interpretive
background, which provides some guidance to drafters and
arbitrators as to the intended meaning of terminology. 143 For this
reason, in particular, a refined approach to drafting is critical.
Although "BIT[s] [impose] reciprocal obligations on both Contracting
States, [their] effects are asymetrical.' 144 Since developing countries
are disparately negatively impacted in the interpretative process, it is
imperative that these countries effectively communicate their
expectations and intentions in the body of their BITs to achieve the
greatest likelihood of interpretation consistent with their intentions.
1.

Interpretive Issues Inherent in the Difficulty of Communicating
Intentions through Language

Any time an affected party, judge, tribunal, or other person reads
a contract, statute, or treaty, the reader engages in some level of
interpretation. The reader must find meaning in the words included
in the writing. Treaty interpretation is an inherent aspect of the
arbitration process and the source of the subsequent inconsistencies
in arbitration decisions. Extensive writings delve into the subject of
treaty interpretation specifically, and this Note does not purport to

140.
Alex Glashausser, What We Must Never Forget When It is a Treaty We are
Expounding, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 1243, 1245 (2005) (stating that treaties have
contractual elements and elements of legislation).
141.
See supratext accompanying note 82.
142.
Wong, supranote 11, at 138.
143.
Glashausser, supra note 140, at 1273. However, since consistency has not
been shown in BIT interpretation this mechanism is not fully available. Further, with
no transparency in the process even consistent interpretations would fail to provide
precedent in subsequent proceedings. Consequently, drafters are critical to providing
the tribunals with the necessary information to produce consistent interpretations
through careful drafting.
144.
Wong, supra note 11, at 138.
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provide a complete summary or analysis of all theories of treaty
interpretation.
A basic understanding of treaty interpretation,
however, provides a foundation for recommending improvements to
treaty drafting. Further, theories of treaty interpretation highlight
several of the issues that exist when writing a treaty.
To start, the physical treaty is a written document that
''145
memorializes a "discussion of terms, conference, [and] negotiation.
It uses language to express the intentions and expectations of the
negotiating parties. 146 Immediately, conflict abounds since "language
as a means of communication is fraught with ambiguities, mistakes,
and deception." 147 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
includes
several treaties
that champion
textualism
over
intentionalism as the appropriate method of interpretation. 148 The
textualist approach presumes that the text is "the authentic
expression of the intentions of the parties.' 1 49
The Vienna
Convention additionally requires that interpretation be "in good
faith," thereby ensuring that the interpretation not lead to an absurd
result.150

Scholars suggest using (and some interpretive bodies do in fact
use) extratextual sources when interpreting treaties. 151 Extratextual
sources, including drafting history, arguably reveal the parties'
underlying legislative intent or purpose, thereby "illuminat[ing] the
meaning of... the text of a statute. ' 15 2 In fact, the European Court
of Justice "gives weight to legislative policy rather than language"
when interpreting different textual versions of European Community
53
Law.1
Interpretative methodologies embrace other factors as well. The
154
purpose of the document is influential to determining its meaning.

145.
Glashausser, supra note 140, at 1248.
146.
Id. at 1258. Glashausser further notes that modern conceptions of treaties
by judges and scholars "have tended to reduce treaties to part statute, part contract."
Id. at 1248. By likening treaties to contracts or legislation, scholars and judges have
implicitly selected the starting point for interpretative theory. Id. at 1249.
147.
Shelton, supra note 16, at 611-12.
148.
Glashausser, supra note 140, at 1260.
149.
Id.
150.
Id. at 1261.
151.
Id. at 1268. The International Court of Justice is a tribunal willing to use
extratextual sources when interpreting treaties, although the Court has formally
announced a rule of strong textualism. Id. at 1264-66.
152.
Michael P. Van Alstine, Dynamic Treaty Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REV.
687, 743 (1998).
153.
Ana M. Lopez-Rodriguez, Towards a European Civil Code without a
Common European Legal Culture? The Link Between Law, Language and Culture, 29
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1195, 1212 (2004).

154.
purpose).

See Glashausser, supra note 140, at 1270-71 (discussing the importance of
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Purpose in the ambit of treaties inevitably includes diplomacy. 155
The cooperation expressed by the countries is embodied in the treaty,
which symbolizes the bond between the nation-states, and is offered
as a unique characteristic of treaties relevant to their
interpretation. 156 Additionally, the subject being interpreted in any
treaty is "presumed to be the definition by sovereign actors of their
'15 7
own formal obligations.
Others suggest that arbitrators guide their interpretation by
"inductive principles" induced from the value judgments reflected in
15 8
the provisions of the treaty to identify broad policies and purposes.
Through this process, one scholar suggests that arbitrators can fill in
the gaps in meaning or application in the treaty. 159 Additionally,
arbitrators may consider the relative bargaining position of the
parties. 16 0
Consideration of bargaining power can justify the
arbitrator resolving "any ambiguity in the text against the . . . party
with more bargaining power.' 161 In the case of BITs, developing
countries are those with less bargaining power and generally prefer
that "any BIT provision that accords rights to the investor and
imposes obligations on the host State" be interpreted restrictively,
while "developed countries will read the same provision
162
expansively."
The maze of methodologies leaves the reader with only
traditional interpretive methods that do not provide concrete
solutions for treaty interpretation. The methods serve as guides for
determining meaning from the text; however, rarely does one
governing text exist. The multilingual aspect of treaties fuels
conflicts of interpretation. For this reason, all of the authoritative
texts should be considered; by consulting multiple texts, the
expectations of the parties are more likely to be met. 16 3 The
multilingual complexities of interpretation require exploration as
well.

155.
treaties is
156.
157.
158.

Id. at 1270. Glashausser posits that the diplomatic purpose of most
inconsistent with strict textualism. Id. at 1300.
Id. at 1271.
Van Alstine, supra note 152, at 707.
Id. at 751.

159.
Id.
160.
Glashausser, supra note 140, at 1272.
161.
Id.
162.
Wong, supra note 11, at 138.
163.
See Glashausser, supra note 140, at 1316
authoritative texts should be considered in all instances").

(stating that

"multiple

1602

2.
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Multiple Authoritative Texts in Different Languages as the
Impetus for Additional Problems

All interpretative methods require that the arbitrator address
the language of the treaty and its various ambiguities, mistakes, and
deceptions. 164 Law and language "are products of the same social,
economic and cultural influences" and, therefore, 'legal thinking
cannot be easily separated from the language in which it is
formed."' 165 The dependency on language, whose foundation garners
meaning from the social and cultural influences that create it, leaves
already conflicted tribunal judges further handicapped in the search
for consistent interpretation. The problems inherent in divining
meaning from language "may be alleviated or exacerbated by drafting
texts in multiple languages."'166 In particular, treaties appear "in not
only one, but typically several, authoritative languages."'1 67 BITs are
written in at least the native languages of both contracting nationstates (as well as in additional languages)-and both treaties are
considered authoritative. 168 Subsequently, several "plain meanings"
Most
potentially exist for each term used in the treaty. 169
interpretative methods, including the "ordinary meaning" method
stipulated in the Vienna Convention of the Law of the Treaties, do
not resolve this dilemma. 170 By embracing a distinctly textualist
approach, interpretive methods such as the Vienna Convention
171
compel drafters to construct the treaty with exacting particularity.
This is particularly difficult when multiple translations are equally
authoritative.
The issue of multilingual text comes up prior to the arbitrator
confronting the existence of multiple ordinary meanings gleaned from
several authoritative texts. The authoritative texts most likely do not
capture the same idea; even if the parties shared a thought at
negotiation, the consensus is probably lost "when that thought is
The
translated into two slightly different sets of words."'1 72
connotations of words that refer to the same basic concepts or that
have the same dictionary meaning vary in different languages; thus,
Subsequently, the text
intended nuances may be missed. 173
doubtfully captures the parties' shared intent, particularly because it

See supratext accompanying note 147.
164.
165.
Lopez-Rodriguez, supra note 153, at 1211.
166.
Shelton, supra note 16, at 612.
167.
Van Alstine, supra note 152, at 742.
Shelton, supra note 16, at 615.
168.
Van Alstine, supranote 152, at 742.
169.
Wong, supra note 11, at 163; see also supratext accompanying notes 76-77.
170.
171.
See Van Alstine, supra note 152, at 744 (noting that extrinsic evidence
should only be used in "exceptional circumstances") (citation omitted).
Glashausser, supranote 140, at 1277-78.
172.
Id. at 1278, 1315.
173.
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is unlikely that there was a true "meeting of the minds. ' 174
Consequently, disputes are ripe in this context. 175 Often ambiguity
may be used deliberately in drafting "due to lack of agreement over
the substance of the text. ' 176 In fact, when drafting a BIT, "the most
difficult problem is probably striking the balance between details and
generalities. ' 177 Although an appropriate balance between flexibility
and clarity must be found, too often the scale is tipped in favor of
flexibility over clarity, as is evidenced by the lack of consistency in
interpretations. 1 78 This practice erodes the reliability that countries
seek when entering a BIT, forcing drafters back to interpretive
dilemmas since they should carefully articulate with specificity the
terms that best reflect the agreement.
Multiculturalism also affects treaty drafting because "peoples
across the globe use and understand language in different ways."'179
When "communicators do not share background knowledge and
assumptions[j . . . 'the best parsing in the world will fail to deliver
the full meaning of a sentence."'1 80 Cultural norms complicate this
since different "legal cultures vary in terms of how precisely people
write."' 81 This "cultural untranslatability" stems from the fact that
many terms are "rooted in the political and legal history of a
particular country."'18 2 Legal terminology is particularly specific to
each national legal system; "[h]ence, a literal translation of a given
legal term in another language may not exactly express the same
concept."'1 3 In many respects, "legalese" is a separate language
184
itself.
Beyond basic definitional issues, the multilingual nature of
bilateral investment treaties is problematic because "when the
negotiating parties' linguistic and cultural backgrounds differ,
[treaty] norms may . . . often be misunderstood."'1 5 Thus, drafters
encounter a conundrum; faced with the necessity of resolving
inconsistency by avoiding ambiguity, drafters must turn to the very
tool that is the crux of confusion: language. Further, not only do
drafters need to use specific language, but they need to translate that

174.

Id.

175.
See Shelton, supra note 16, at 619 n.40 (quoting Michel de Montaigne
[translation] 'Most of the instances of the world's troubles are grammatical. Our trials
would not arise but for the debate over laws' interpretation.").
176.
Id. at 620.
177.

DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 24, at 14.

178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184

Id.
Glashausser, supra note 140, at 1280.
Id.
Id. at 1281.
Shelton, supra note 16, at 619.
Lopez-Rodriguez, supra note 153, at 1200.
Rose Kennedy, Much Ado About Nothing: Problems in

TranslationIndustry, 14 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 423, 426 (2000).

185.

Glashausser, supra note 140, at 1276.
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language as well. So the problem stems from the combination of
linguistic failures to capture intention universally and issues of
translation. Simply throwing one's hands up at this juncture does
nothing to alleviate the problem of inconsistency.
Leaving all
solutions to ex post interpretation clearly does little once the
magnitude of the difficulties encountered during interpretation is
illuminated. Thus, some ex ante improvements must be explored.

VI. PROPOSAL FOR A COMPILATION OF KEY TERMINOLOGY TO SERVE AS
A MULTILINGUAL "THESAURUS" FOR THE PURPOSE OF DRAFTING
IMPROVEMENTS

A. Why MultilateralInvestment TreatiesAre Not the Solution
Attempts at multilateral investment treaties were made
following the extinction of the Hull Rule and general abatement of
international custom on direct investment. 18 6 These attempts failed,
however, "because they had to address wide-ranging interests of
'18 7
multiple countries that were ultimately too striated to reconcile.
The diverse interests represented in the investment sphere and
variety of domestic practices, combined with the history of a lack of
multilateral agreement on these issues, suggest that a multilateral
investment treaty would not be feasible or preferable.18 8 Therefore,
improvements will more easily be accomplished through agreement
on nomenclature, denotation, and connotation than attempts to
garner universal agreement in a multilateral treaty. Further, a
multilateral treaty will not solve the problems of interpretation that
are encountered in the multilingual sphere. A multilateral treaty
would not resolve the interpretive problems that exist when trying to
extract a single meaning from multiple texts in various languages.1 8 9
For a multilateral agreement process to succeed, a common legal
discourse would be required, which would have to be multilingual.1 90
B. Characteristicsof an Improved Draft
The meaning of the specific terms used is all the more critical
since the text of treaties is often deliberately ambiguous. 19 1

186.
Wong, supra note 11, at 140; see supratext accompanying notes 29-30.
187.
Wong, supra note 11, at 140.
188.
COSBEY ET AL., supra note 22, at 21.
189.
See supra note 82.
190.
Lopez-Rodriguez, supra note 153, at 1218. The author also notes that
"[t]his multilingual discourse would, of course, presuppose the existence of polyglot
lawyers and academics in command of many languages." Id.
191.
Glashausser, supra note 140, at 1275.
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Deliberate ambiguity often promotes international cooperation and
provides leaders political flexibility when seeking ratification of a
treaty. 192 This ambiguity, however, proves fatal when seeking
reliability and consistent interpretations in arbitration. Ambiguity is
193
fodder for arbitration, and thus, the antithesis of good drafting.
Although it may serve a diplomatic purpose, it ultimately is a source
of great dispute. 19 4 Semantic ambiguity arises out of the words
themselves. 195 The drafter must clarify its meaning when colorable
arguments exist for multiple meanings. 196 Issues of multilingualism
and translation compound this problem and could be improved by
creating pre-draft consensus on terminology.
C. A Compilation of Key Terminology as a Resource for Improved
Draftingand Interpretation
Although resources already exist for the treaty writer, no single
source exists providing a compilation of terminology, and therefore,
there is no across-the-board agreement on definitions for commonly
used terminology.' 97 To effectuate change, this Note suggests that a
non-governmental
or
international
organization
compile
a
"thesaurus" of terminology spanning multiple languages that would
serve as the guide to treaty drafters. The broad scheme entails each
country submitting a "dictionary" or "definitions article" listing words
or terms that the country would use if constructing its own model
BIT. Along with the list, the country would include a definition and
short explanation of the connotations of that word and the scope of
the meaning. This thesaurus would serve as a tool for drafters and
arbitrators. Once compiled, the thesaurus would provide drafters
with the bank of basic terms necessary for constructing provisions
that capture the expectations of the nation-states party to the treaty.
Further, arbitrators could use the resource as evidence of the ex ante
intentions of the contracting parties. Variations from these norms
would provide further guidance as indications of alternative
intentions of the contracting parties.
BITs are relatively similar across the board, encompassing
similar obligations and addressing limited and specific issues. 198 The

192.

Id. at 1275-76.

193.
THOMAS R. HAGGARD, CONTRACT LAW FROM A DRAFTING PERSPECTIVE-AN
INTRODUCTION TO CONTRACT DRAFTING FOR LAW STUDENTS 39 (2003).

194.
195.
196.
197.

See supra text accompanying note 176.
HAGGARD, supra note 193, at 39.
Id.
See generally Katherine Guerin, International Contracts and Terminology:

An Annotated Research Guide for the U.S. Practitioner,29 INT'L J. LEGAL INFO. 575

(2001) (providing a broad range of useful interpretive sources but recognizing that the
sources are by no means comprehensive").
198.
See supra Part III.
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intentions and expectations of the parties, however, vary within these
issues. The proliferation of treaties further suggests a formulaic
approach by many countries. These particular treaties require a
limited bank of key terminology. Subsequently, creating a universal
consensus on terminology is achievable, so long as consensus only
requires individual countries stating their chosen terminology, rather
than universal agreement. Individual countries' submissions would
then be compiled to map the terminology across languages.
The goal is to improve the drafting of the treaties and the ability
of developing countries with less bargaining power to ensure that
their conception of the negotiation and agreement is captured in the
treaty. By using a bank of terms that has previously been given
meaning and compiled to create a consensus across languages on the
chosen word to fill a specific role, both parties can be clearer on what
is being agreed to and memorialized in the formal document.
Developing countries will be able to rely more on the documents,
knowing that their conception of the investment treaty has been
memorialized.
This will not resolve all interpretive issues. The compilation
could not possibly contain all the possible terms or general words that
could be used in any BIT. Further, it would not address the
grammatical issues that can plague language and change meaning
across translations. The universal agreement on key terms across
languages, however, puts more of the chips on the table. Both parties
are better informed as to what tools they are working with in
constructing the treaty. Therefore, a meeting of the minds is more
likely to exist. The benefit of the thesaurus existing as a bank of all
languages is that it empowers otherwise disenfranchised countries;
the thesaurus ensures that their language will be on the same
playing field as the already dominant languages.
Although the intention of the thesaurus would be to improve the
drafting process and thereby produce more clearly worded documents
that accurately represent the parties' intentions, it would also prove
helpful when disputes arise.
Since the predominant method of
interpretation is a textualist approach, a single compiled resource
containing the expected application of specific terminology should aid
in the interpretive process. By providing the arbitrators with a
resource that demonstrates the prior intentions of the party, the
arbitration will likely lead to results more in line with the parties'
expectations. This will ultimately further the goal of improved
consistency in application and interpretation of BITs.
As the consistency of interpretation improves, all parties
involved-developing countries in particular-will be able to rely on
BITs more faithfully. Increased reliability is inherently beneficial.
Further, reliable interpretations will lead to continued improvement
in the drafting process, as consistent interpretations will create a
precedential jurisprudence for the parties to the treaties.
Such
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precedent could then be used to guide their drafting of future BITs.
Developing countries are more likely, then, to reap the benefits they
attempt to sow when entering a BIT. Subsequently, the use of BITs
will continue, if not increase. 199
To effectuate this goal, two prominent routes seem apparent: (1)
forming a new non-governmental organization or (2) mobilizing an
existing international organization. The first option of forming a new
non-governmental organization appears most daunting as it would
require not only the consensus of numerous countries but also
financial support for its formulation. To be credible, each individual
government of the participating nation-state must agree to the
proposed terminology for its country, otherwise the entries would
merely be scholarly recommendations (which, although helpful, would
not have as substantial an impact on reliability and predictability).
Thus the formation of an independent organization that would serve
as a depository of terms provides political as well as financial hurdles.
Organizing and mobilizing only the least developed or developing
nations of the world poses a substantial task due to opportunism,
mistrust, and collective action problems.
Further, if those countries do organize as a unit to support the
creation of an independent organization, they will still be plagued
with political hurdles and the task of funding that organization. To
be complete, the compilation would require submissions not only from
the developing nations, but also from developed nations.
An
independent organization created solely by developing nations would
probably struggle to garner sufficient respect in the international
community to get reliable submissions from developed nations.
Further, any document produced by the independent organization
would only have the backing of the nations that created the
organization and therefore would probably lack clout in future
proceedings.
Finally, the financial responsibility of funding the
organization would fall on the countries that have the least resources
with which to do so.
The benefit of an independent organization, or one created by
unifying developing countries (as was done to defeat the Hull Rule), is
that this organization would be less likely to fall prey to the desires of
developed nations.
By creating the organization through the
combined efforts of developing nations, those nations would, in effect,
re-orient the disparate bargaining power that infuses the negotiation
process. For this reason, developing countries may find this route
most attractive. By forming their own organization, these countries

199.
This is premised on the assumption that BITs are beneficial to developing
countries. Although one may debate the normative value of BITs, in the absence of an
international body of law or multilateral agreement on foreign direct investment, BITs
seem to provide developing countries the greatest access to the advantages of
investment by protecting investor rights.
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would be taking full control over the process of compiling the
thesaurus. The disadvantages of this route (e.g. lack of support from
developed nations and lack of funding) suggest, however, that the
most appropriate forum for such a compilation is an existing
international organization. This does not preclude an independent
organization from playing a pivotal role in the formulation of the
compilation; it merely suggests that the organization would be most
successful by working through an existing international caucus.
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) may be the appropriate existing forum for such an
endeavor. UNCTAD is a subsidiary organ of the United Nations
General Assembly. 20 0 At UNCTAD conferences member nations
assess "current trade and development issues, discuss policy options
and formulate global policy responses. '20 1
UNCTAD facilitates
"intergovernmental consensus building regarding the state of the
world economy and development policies. ' 20 2 UNCTAD also helps
2 03
identify the UN's role in addressing economic development issues.
It serves as "an authoritative knowledge-based institution whose
work aims to help shape current policy debates and thinking on
development. '20 4
One of UNCTAD's three key functions is
undertaking "research, policy analysis and data collection for the
debates of government representatives and experts. '20 5 Therefore,
UNCTAD generally provides the appropriate forum for such an
exercise to occur. It would provide organization and resources for the
process of compilation, international support for the final product,
and legitimacy through the participation of developed states.
The Trade and Development Board serves as the overseer of all
activities of UNCTAD. 20 6 Further justification for this avenue is that
Board membership is open to all State members of UNCTAD, and
intergovernmental as well as non-governmental organizations may
observe meetings. 20 7 Therefore, all developing nations that are
members of the UN and UNCTAD could be represented on the board.
Additionally, any organized, independent non-governmental or

200.
UNCTAD Conferences, http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intltem
ID=3375&lang-- (last visited Oct. 15, 2007).
201.
Id.
202.
Id.
203.
Id.
204.
About
UNCTAD,
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intIteml
D=1530&lang-l (last visitedOct. 15, 2007).
205.
Id.
The other two functions include serving as a forum for
intergovernmental deliberations aimed at consensus building and providing technical
assistance.
206.
UNCTAD, Trade and Development Board, http://www.unctad.org/
Templates/Page.asp?intltemlD=1906&lang=1 (last visited Oct. 15, 2007).
207
UNCTAD,
The
Intergovernmental
Process, http://www.unctad.org/
Templates/Page.asp?intltemlD=3360&lang=1 (last visited Oct. 15, 2007).
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intergovernmental organization created to champion this task could
apply for observer status and be present at the meetings.
UNCTAD's most recent conference in Sdo Paulo, Brazil, included
an agreement to better integrate NGOs, the private sector, and
This demonstrates
academia into the work of UNCTAD. 20 8
UNCTAD's recognition of the important role that "civil society" plays
in advocating for development and adding value. This agreement
additionally demonstrates a willingness to work with these
organizations in joint meetings and discussion forums in order to
foster concrete development outcomes. 20 9 Thanks to this recognition,
it would be possible for a non-governmental organization to facilitate
the compilation of terminology and then introduce it to UNCTAD
through this civil society outreach focus. Thus, the work could
maintain independence, in terms of protection from undue influence
by developed countries, while simultaneously garnering the support
and subsequent legitimacy from acceptance by such a large and
influential international organization as the UN.
The credibility-and therefore binding quality-of BITs can be
increased by promoting improvements in the drafting process. By
providing a compilation of terminology across multiple languages,
drafters as well as interpreters can focus on a single resource as the
primary resource demonstrating the basic expectations of the
contracting parties. To produce such a compilation will require
international mobilization. This process can be spear-headed by
either a non-governmental organization or an existing international
governmental organization. A non-governmental organization would
provide the benefit of independence from the influence of powerful
However, it potentially lacks sufficient
developed countries.
credibility to (1) prompt countries to submit to the compilation and (2)
ensure its future use of the resource in drafting as well as
interpretation. Turning to existing international organizations, the
UN provides sufficient clout to support any international compilation.
Within the UN, UNCTAD serves as the appropriate forum for raising
the specific concerns presented, as well as for implementing the
campaign for change.

VII. CONCLUSION
Foreign direct investment is a crucial part of a globalized
economy. Since the universal rejection of the Hull Rule and other
international customary laws regarding protection of foreign

http://www.unctad.org/
Society,
and
Civil
UNCTAD
UNCTAD,
208.
Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=3455&lang-l (last visited Oct. 15, 2007).
209.
Id.
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investments, BITs have served as the primary mechanism for
regulating investment relations. BITs memorialize the negotiations
between two independent nation-states regarding obligations,
regulations, and expectations in investment. Both the nation-state
parties to the BITs, as well as private investors who operate under
the auspices of BITs, depend on these treaties for reliability and
stability through credible and binding commitments.
The reliability, and therefore stability, provided by BITs,
however, expires when tribunals resolve disputes through
inconsistent interpretations of treaties.
Where no consistent
interpretation exists, there is no reliable source of commitment.
Arbitration reform is one means of improving the situation. Through
increased transparency and appellate review, scholars argue, more
consistent interpretations will result. These changes in the arbitral
system, however, run contrary to the attractive characteristics of
arbitration: privacy and efficiency.
Furthermore, neither fully
resolves the interpretive conflicts.
Interpretation of BITs, and treaties generally, is a complex
exercise. Multiple methods of interpretation exist, including focus on
the intent or spirit of the treaty and use of extratextual resources. All
methods, however, ultimately rest on the text of the document, and
therefore on language. Language generally poorly communicates a
party's intentions and fails to fully captures the party's meaning, and
multilingual translations only compound the problem.
These
dilemmas, however, should not prevent drafters from focusing on
improved contracting to encourage consistent application and
interpretation. Compiling key terminology used in BITs as submitted
by individual nation-states in their native language would aid in this
process.
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